I. Introduction
The debate on the relationship between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol on the one hand and the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the other hand raises both old and new issues. The old issues are th ose which have been discnssed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ WTO trade and environment debate for the past fifteen years, in particular the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and the world trading system and the treatment of process and production methods, among others. The main new elements are the sense of urgency which characterises the elima te change debate, as weil as the range of different policy measures which may be needed to reach carbon emissions targets; these measures may concern several WTO agreements, including the GATT, the Agreemeut on Technical Barriers to Trade (TET), the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Moreover, the solutions chosen to curb emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) may vary from country to country, or groups of countries may get together to implement common regional solutions, th us adding to the diversity of possible scenarios.
Certain measures and policies implen1ented under clin1ate change treaties will involve interaction with WTO disciplines. They will affect competitiveness of the suppliers of goods and services, and it may be tempting for affected parties (economie operators and governments) to resort to trade measures in orcier to try to 'leve! the playing field'. As a starting-point, we should assume nevertheless thal it is possible for governments to implement their !rade and climate change obligations simultaneously and harmoniously. lt is a well-accepted principle of international law that states are presumed to undertake their international obligations in good faith so thal they can be implemented without conflict. This principle is reflected in Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC:
The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economie system that would lead to sustainable economie grmvth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrm-y or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
One should also remember that the WTO has a very specifie mandate in the international legal orcier, which is to promote the liberalisation of international trade (in goods and services) and fight protectionism. At the same time, the WTO framework provides space for governments to pursue and implement non-trade policy objectives and obligations. Importantly, like the Climate Change Convention, the WTO aims at promoting sustainable development 2 The primary responsibility for ensuring the coherent development of public international law remains with states. Dialogue among intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) has also an important role to play in building coherence, but il is not sufficient. One of the main challenges in the climate change debate is that it requires extensive collaboration among all actors concerned: states and IGOs, but also non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scientific experts and multinational enterprises, among ath ers, in arder to be environmentally effective. As will be briefly discussed below, WTO rules autborise Members, in certain circumstances, to maintain 'unilateral' !rade restrictions when such actions comply with the prescriptions of Article XX of the GATT (or Article XIV of the GATS). Y et, such unilateral actions al one will not necessarily be able to address effectively challenges arising from climate change. Jt will be important to lake into account actions by all WTO Members, including actions which may be adopted and implemented by groups of co un tries (on a regional basis or otherwise). Bath the WTO and the UNFCCC will need to ensure the active involvement of developing countries in the discussions, in arder to devise appropriate ways to reduce GHG emissions without impairing economie development. Jt will be essential to gain a full understanding of the environmental alternatives thal are most appropriate and efficient among the various measures thal are consistent with WTO rules. This task will require very extensive collaboration between scientific experts on climate change, economists and lawyers. In this context, and as stated by Pascal Lamy, '[t] he WTO, far from beinghegemonic as it is sometimes portrayed to be, recognizes ils limited competence and the specialization of other international organizations'.
3 Indeed the WTO is not the forum where 'standards' are discussed and negotiated, but it does offer a forum where the !rade effects of such measures can be discussed, monitored and litigated. Thus the real challenge of the WTO will be to ensure thal this nonhegemonie attitude is maintained. This contribution briefly examines varions aspects of the WTO institutional framework which are relevant to the climate change debate. Jt will look at the instruments available in the WTO for conducting policy dialogue with other IGOs and NGOs. Jt will then discuss the role thal standards developed in other IGOs can play in the WTO.
W e should also note th at most of the questions thal arise wh en examining the institutional aspects of the WTO/UNFCCC relationship are horizontal, in the sense thal they extend to other interfaces, such as trade and the environment in general, and !rade and human rights, among others. The 'trade and climate change' debate is an extension of the more general 'trade and .. .' debate.
II. Existing basis for co-operation with IGOs and NGOs

A. Co-operation between WTO and other IGOs
The varions forms of institutional co-operation
The 2006 Report of the Director-General of the WTO on Coherence in Global Policy-making 4 highlights thal, through its councils and committees, the WTO main tains extensive institutional relations with numero us other international organisations; there are sorne 140 international organisations that have observer status in WTO bodies. The WTO also participates as observer in the work of many international organisations. In all, the WTO Secretariat main tains working relations with almost 200 international organisations in activities ranging from statistics, research, standard-setting, and technical assistance to training.
Pursuant to Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement, the General Council must 'make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations thal have responsibilities related to those of the WTO'. The General Council regulation allows IGOs to request observer status in WTO committees which is granted subject to a consensus decision by Members. Severa! IGOs received such status, but in 1999 tensions arase due to the refusai of sorne Mernbers to grant observer status to the League of Arab Nations. Since then, Members have not been able to reach consensus on any forma! request for observership. However, WTO Members and the WTO Secretariat have developed pragmatic alternative solutions for granting ad hoc observership and for collaboration with the secretariats of other IGOs
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The co-operation between UNEP /MEAs and the WTO deserves specifie mention. In the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration, Ministers welcomed the continued co-operation of the WTO with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and other intergovernmental environmental organisations and encouraged efforts to promote co-operation between the WTO and relevant international environmental and developmental organisations 6 The WTO Secretariat has a co-operation on an ad hoc meeting-by-meeting basis. Severa! MEAs, including the UNFCCC, have observer status in the CTE; together with other MEAs, the UNFCCC is also invited to the CTESS on an ad hoc basis. Ten years ago, the CTE started so-called 'MEA information sessions', which allowed WTO Members to receive firsthand information from MEA secretariats. The UNFCCC Secretariat has participated in seven such exchanges and has submitted severa! information notes briefing CTE members on developments under the UNFCCC. 7 The WTO Secretariat collabora tes with other international organisations on the tapie of trade and the environment, including secretariats of MEAs, which allows the conveyance of information on relevant discussions in the CTE and CTESS. joint activities between the WTO and MEA secretariats, including the UNFCCC, have also developed, such as co-authorship of CTE documents and participation of MEA secretariats in WTO technical co-operation activities on trade and the environment. In some instances, the collaboration goes further. The WTO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Codex Alimentarius secretariats work together in the sectors relating to health and SPS measures, and collabora te in bringing attention to the need for policy coherence between trade and health matters at the global and nationallevels. Indeed, there are WTO provisions which explicitly state that measures complying with standards and norms developed in specified international organisations-such as the Codex-are presumed to be compatible with WTO obligations. Should the WTO envisage a similar approach with the UNFCCC?
When exan1ining the relationships between international organisations, one should distinguish the organisations themselves from their secretariats. As noted above, there has been increasing collaboration at the leve! of the secretariats (including technical co-operation, joint notes or studies) and varions options have already been explored. However, whether at the WTO or elsewhere, the competences of the secretariats are limited (they do not normally in elude decision-making) and underlain by their obligation to remain neutra! vis-à-vis the membership. Secretariats of international organisations, while they may have somewhat different responsibilities, are not supranational bodies with independent powers (like the EC Commission, for instance), and this situation is unlikely to change saon. The role they can play in ensuring global policy coherence and mutual support is consequently limited.
Participation ofiGOs in the WTO dispute settlement process
There is no provision dealing specifically with the participation of!GOs in the WTO dispute settlement process. Sorne WTO provisions impose consultations with another !GO (such as Article XV of the GATT requiring consultation with the International Monetary Fund (!MF)). Other provisions, such as those contained in the SPS, require panels to examine, for instance, whether a challenged national measure is consistent with standards contained in the Codex; in such situations, formal and informa! exchanges between the panel and the secretariat concerned take place in order for the WTO panel to be informed of the natnre of such standards. More generally, a panel could invoke the right to seek information under Article 13 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to consul! an !GO on a technical or other scientific issue; but so far, this provision has been used to consul! individual experts, even when IGOs cmùd have been, a priori, adequate interlocutors 9 Varions reasons may deter panels from seeking expertise directly from an !GO, such as the fear of engaging in a cumbersome and time-consuming procedure ( especially in cases where the membership of that organisation would have to be consulted) and awareness of the constraints (obligation of neutrality) faced by its secretariat.
Final! y, we should recall thal the Appellate Body has stated on severa! occasions that individuals or organisations can subtnit amicus curiae briefs to the Appellate Body or to panels, which have, however, no obligation to consider them."' No !GO has laken such an initiative so far. Note thal, if accepted, the EC proposa! on MEAs tabled in the CTESS (discussed below), would make it compulsory for panels to seek the expertise of relevant MEAs in trade and environment disputes.
B. Collaboration with NGOs and other non-state actors
The WTO Secretariat and its Director-General
NGOs and other non-state actors can offer very useful expertise and il is thus important to be able to include them in debates. How the WTO should deal with NGOs and more generally how it should improve the transparency of its activities has been an important issue sin ce the entry into force of the WTO. The so-called 'external transparency' of the organisation has been much discussed among ils Members, who have traditionally held -and stiJl hold -extreme positions. Even if, arguably, more can still be done, it has to be recognised that considerable efforts have been made over the past ten years to make WTO activities more transparent and to increase interaction with NGOs and other nongovernmental actors.
The basis for establishing relations with non-governmental NGOs is Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement, which stipulates that '[t]he General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governrnental organizations concerned with rnatters related to those of the WTO'. The framework for relations with NGOs is further defined in the Guidelines for Arrangemer;ts on Relations with NGOs, adopted by the General Council in 1996, where Members 'recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs' 11 According to the Guidelines, the primary vehicles for interaction with NGOs are the WTO Secretariat and its Director-General, who are encouraged to 'play a more active role in its direct contacts with NGOs' through various means, such as 'the organization on an ad hoc basis of symposia on specifie WTO-related issues, informai arrangements to receive the information NGOs may wish to make available for consultation by interested delegations and the continuation of past practice of responding to requests for general information and briefings about the WTO'. On this basis, the Secretariat has developed a number of activities with NGOs, including symposia, the annual 'Public Forum', NGOs briefings, circulation of NGO briefing pa pers on the WTO website, and so-called 'issue specifie dialogues with civil society'. Although environmental NGOs have been traditionally very much involved in ali these activities, climate change and trade has attracted specifie interest only recently: until 2007, no NGO had requested inclusion of this topic on the agenda of the Public Forum and no NGO position paper had been submitted to the WTO Secretariat. However, this is changing: for instance, no Jess than four sessions were devoted to this theme during the 2007 WTO Public Forum, which was organised by various actors of civil society together with the WTO Secretariat.
The WTO is restrictive when it comes to the participation of NGOs and other non-governrnental actors in its bodies. Two main arguments, reflected in the Guidelines, are invoked to keep the doors toits meetings closed. First, the 'special character of the WTO, which is both a legally binding inter-governmental treaty of rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for negotiations', and, second, the view that consultation and co-operation with NGOs must taize place primarily at 11 Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162. the national leve!, 'where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interests which are brought to bear on trade policy-making'-' 2 Hence the 'broadly held view' thal it is not possible for NGOs to be direct! y involved in the work of the WTO or ils meetings. This position was reaffirmed by many Members on the occasion of a passionate debate in the General Council in relation to the Appellate Body's initiative to issue rnles for procedures for amicus briefs in the EC -Asbestos dispute. NGOs are, however, allowed to attend (without the righi to speak) the plenary sessions of ministerial conferences if they demonstrate th at their activities are concerned with matters related to th ose of the WT0. 13 And nothing prevents individual members from including NGO representatives in their national delegation, which sorne do on a regular basis.
Other organisations, including the UNFCCC, go further than the WTO in this regard by providing a quasi-automatic right for interested non-state actors to be granted observer status. For instance, Article 7.6 of the UNFCCC provides, inter alia, thal '[a]ny body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of ils wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at !east one third of the Parties present abject'. It would be desirable for the WTO to adopt-or at !east come doser to-the more generons practice followed by other international organisations as far as participation by NGOs and other non-state actors is concerned. A number ofNGOs would be able to contribute to enhancing the understanding of WTO ru! es and principles by the public at large and to increasing the legitimacy of the role of the WTO in the international community. However, this issue still meets with strong resistance from many Members, in particular developing countries.
Participation of NGOs in the WTO dispute settlement process
The dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO has brought abont clarifications on the meaning and the scope of the provisions of the WTO that are related to the enviromnent and, in this context, many actors-and in particular NGOs-have requested a right to participate in these disputes in order to submit their views. U nder the DSU, on! y Member governments can initiale a dispute and participate in the proceedings. Nevertheless, NGOs have somehow invited themselves into the process by sending unsolicited amicus curiae briefs to panels. The first dispute in which such an initiative was laken was the US -Shrimp dispute: sorne NGOs sent amicus curiae briefs to the panel, which decided it could not accept them. On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the panel decision and found thal the 'right to seek information' provided for in Article 13 of the DSU allowed panels to accept unsolicited briefs. Since the US -Shrimp dispute, various panels have received such briefs.
14 In EC -Asbestos, the Appellate Body adopted special rules of procedure for interested parties to file amicus curiae briefs, an initiative which triggered strong reactions among members. 15 The treatment by panels and the Appellate Body of amicus curiae briefs is still controversial among WTO Members, as evidenced by proposais made in the DSU review. While sorne Members, like the European Communities and the United States, are in favour of developing procedural rules for submission of amicus curiae briefs, 16 various developing countries have proposed to make il clear thal the 'right to seek information' cannat be read as entailing the right for panels to accept unsolicited information.
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A related and more recent question in this context concerns the right of NGOs and other interested parties to observe meetings of the panel and A pp ella te Body. The issue of public hearings was raised in the DSU review where sorne Members proposed the adoption of measures for making panel and Appellate Body meetings public. 18 Recently, severa! panels 19 agreed to allow the public to observe meetings, at the request of 14 For further details, see J. Durling 19 The Appellate Body has never held a public hearing so far. the parties. The event was publicised on the WTO website and those interested were allowed ta watch the meeting being broadcast 'live' in a separate room at the WTO. Participation by NGOs in these events was disappointingly law. Incorporating sorne transparency into the dispute settlement proceedings is desirable as it would contribute to demystifying the processes followed by the panel and Appellate Body and do away with the image of 'faceless bureaucrats'. Publicity of justice is a wellestablished principle in democracies ('Publicity is the very sou! of justice'"') and, with the appropriate safeguards in place (for instance to protee! confidential business information), allowing the public to watch meetings of the panel and A pp ella te Body could contribute to reinforcing the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system. The compliance mechanisms in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have been considered to rem ain weak.
22 Article 14 of the UNFCCC calls the parties to 'seek a seUlement of the dispute through negotiation or any peaceful means of their own choice'. Parties may recognise 'as compulsory ipso facto' submission of the dispute to the International Court of justice (ICJ) or to arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. If the parties cannat seUle their dispute through these means, it can then be submiUed, at the request of a party concerned, to a conciliation commission which 'shaH render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith' (Article 14.6). Article 14 of the UNFCCC applies mutatis mutandis to disputes arising under the Kyoto Protocol (Article 19).
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However, the different natures of these dispute seUlement mechanisms, and their possible imbalance, should not be a cause for concern in practice as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol contain different types of obligations from those of the WTO agreements. This means that the competences of WTO and UNFCCC dispute seUlement mechanisms should not overlap and have no reason to 'compete'. lt also means that there is little scope for governments to do 'forum shopping'. The main question is rather whether, for instance, the mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Protocol, in particular the flexibilities built therein to reach GHG reduction targets, could be invoked to justify trade restrictions otherwise inconsistent with WTO obligations. Another important question is the weight that would be aUached to being a signatory to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol in assessing compatibility of trade measures with WTO rules, should a non-signatory challenge such measures in the WTO. In other words, the issue at stake is how the WTO 22 According to Birnie and Boyle, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 'are strong on reporting, expert inspection and rcview, and multilateral consultation, but they remain weak on dispute seUlement and non-compliance, where further development is awaited'. P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environ ment, second edition (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 532. 23 ln addition, signatories to the Kyoto Protocol adopted 'Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol' (Decision 24/CP.7, 10 November 2001 ). This compliance mechanîsm is detailed and appears to be more stringent th an those of other environmental agreements. Under this system, an 'enforcement branch' has the responsibilîty of detennining wh ether an Annex I party is in compliance with its emission targets. Should it find non-compliance (for instance, when a party has exceeded its emission targets), it can require that party to bring itself into compliance. For that purpose, the enforcement branch can require the party to submit an action plan and suspend the eligibility of that party to make transfers in emissions trading.
dispute settlement system would 'use' non-WTO law in the adjudication of disputes. This is discussed in the following section 24
B. Non-WTO law in the WTO dispute settlement system
Under the DSU, the jurisdiction of panels and the Appellate Body is limited to daims of violation of WTO agreements. Hence, a WTO Member could not resort to the DSU to seek redress for an alleged breach of an MEA. This does not mean, however, that non-WTO law has no role to play in WTO disputes. The issue is rather how and for what purpose non-WTO law can be used in daims of breach of WTO agreements brought pursuant to the DSU. We believe that generally non-WTO law can be used in two different ways, with two different purposes. First, non-WTO law can be referred to in the interpretation of concepts and terms contained in WTO agreements, with a view to ascertaining their tneaning. For instance, more recent environmental treaties have been referred to for the purpose of interpreting in an evolutionary mann er GATT provisions which were drafted sixty years ag o. The typical example is the US-Shrimp dispute in which the Appellate Body decided to resort to 'modern international conventions and declarations' to interpret the concept of 'exhaustible natural resources' found in Article X:X(g) of the GATT; it looked at instruments such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS), the Convention on Biological Diversity ( CBD) and Agenda 21 25 to con elude th at 'exhaustible natural resources' included biological resources, such as sea turtles, and not only finite resources, such as oil and ores (which seemed to have been the intention of the drafters in 1947). Under this scenario, non-WTO law is taken into account if it can be considered to represent a sufficient degree of consensus among WTO Members, but identical membership between the WTO and the environmental treaty concerned is not required 26 In the context of a climate change-related dispute, this would mean th at, wh en interpreting Article XX(g) of the GATT, for instance, a panel or the Appellate Body could refer to other treaties, like the UNFCCC or the Montreal Protocol, to determine wh ether the ozone layer or the atmosphere could be considered 'exhaustible natural resources' .
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The second instance in which non-WTO law can be referred to is when assessing whether a specifie national measure complies, in casu, with a WTO provision (obligation or exception), or, in ether words, when determining the appropria te application of that WTO provision. For instance, in US -Shrimp (Article 21.5 Malaysia), the Appellate Body, wh en assessing the US measure in light of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, considered that the existence of regional fishing arrangements negotiated by the United States demonstrated the good faith of the US in its efforts to protect sea turtles 28 In this scenario, al! relevant treaties can be taken into account, even if they are concluded among a small number of countries, as they are only used as one of the facts that would support an allegation 29 In this sense, reliance on international or even regional standards may provide a de facto presumption of good faith, as required by Article XX. 30 This brings about another institutional challenge, though: the legitimacy of the WTO to be the one institution assessing whether a trade restriction is effectively 'based on' mechanisms and standards set up in other treaties and I GO s.
However, Pauwelyn and others argue that, in situations where a WTO obligation would conflict with a right granted in another treaty, the WTO panel should first assess which of the two treaties' provisions prevails. Should the panel find that the provision contained in the non-WTO treaty prevails, then the WTO dispute system would need to apply and enforce that treaty. 31 We believe that WTO panels can only 27 In this context, we would like to stress that interpretation ofWTO terms is not limitcd to disputes. What we have just said should be used in 'day-to-day' national policy-making involving trade and environment issues. 28 2 WTO provisions, but in doing so, they will need to look at non-WTO law, often as factual matters, to interpret the relevant applicable WTO provisions; indeed, WTO provisions themselves often induce defending parties to invoke participation in other treaties as evidence of their legitimate policy objective and good faith. Setting aside the debate on 'WTO applicable law', i.e. to wh at extent and how a treaty not signed between the parties to a WTO dispute could be used in such a dispute, 33 it remains clear thal, in the case of a dispute involving national measures allegedly based on the Kyoto Protocol, a WTO panel will examine the Protocol, if only to reject ils relevance. We believe thal Members cannat disregard their WTO obligations beyond the situations envisaged in WTO exception provisions; in other words, Members can derogate their WTO obligations only in situations defined by the WTO agreements themselves.
34 lt is for WTO Members to make the necessary adjustments through new law-making (e.g. amendments or understandings) if they consider th at the current WTO legal framework does not allow them to comply simultaneously with other international obligations they have contracted. But il is not up to adjudicating bodies to engage in law-making to fil! a legal vacuum.
In our view, Members can find ways to implement the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol harmoniously with the WTO. The Appellate Body has insisted on the need to maintain a balance between !rade liberalisation and the right to pursue other policy objectives, as contemplated in exception provisions. This has allowed the preservation of policy and Organization law-questions of jurisdiction and merits ', journal of World 'l'rade 37 (2003) . , legal space for Members to comply with their rights and obligations under other treaties without undermining WTO objectives. WTO adjudicating bodies have shawn thal WTO and non-WTO rules can be interpreted and applied in a harmonious manner, thus directly contributing to international legal coherence. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, therefore, can find an appropria te place in the adjudication of trade disputes. Measures adopted un der the auspices of these two instruments should be found compatible with WTO rules, for instance, if they comply with the provisions of Article XX of the GA TT or ath er relevant WTO agreements (such as the TBT), and assuming that they are taken in good faith and do not pursue protectionist purposes.
C. The use in the WTO of international standards developed by other organisations
The issue of trade and climate change also presents interesting institutional questions since it may involve situations where a WTO Member decides to adopt a national regulation based on existing international standards developed in another !GO. This begs the question of how the WTO deals with, and considers, norms and international standards negotiated in other fora, and whether the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Proto col can be considered as setting 'international standards'. Turning to the first question, the WTO does not treal ail international standards in the same way: they have a particularly 'high profile' in the TBT and SPS, which deal explicitly with such standards and favour their harmonisation. The definition of 'international standards' contained in Annex A to the SPS appoints the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), International Office of Epizooties (now the World Organisation for Animal Health) (OIE) and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) as forums whose standards are given legal weight in WTO disputes. The standards developed by the Codex, OIE and IPPC for human, animal and plant health, respectively, are, under the terms of their own constitutive documents, non-binding. However, Article 3.1 of the SPS provides that 'Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recornmendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement'. Moreover, Article 3.2 states that SPS measures ofWTO Members that are in conforrnity with international standards, guidelines, or recommendations shall be 'presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement'. So, while the Codex and other bodies by no means legislate in the normal or full sense, the norms they produce have a certain authority in creating a presumption of WTO compatibility when such international standards are respected. The SPS th us provides important incentives for states to base their natioi1al standards upon, or to fit them to, these international standards. Therefore, the WTO encourages Members to negotiate norms in other international fora which they will then implement coherently in the context of the WTO. Members can nevertheless adopt norms higher than the international standards as long as they comply with the SPS, including Article 5 on risk assessments.
The same is !rue of the TBT. Article 2.4 of the TBT requires Members to use 'relevant international standards' as a basis for their technical regulations, unless the international standards are an inappropriate or in effective means to a chi eve legitima te objectives. Article 2.5 of the TBT further stipulates thal a technical regtùation which is in accordance with relevant international standards 'shall be rebuttably presumed not to crea te an unnecessary obstacle to international trade'. So, deviations from international standards are discouraged. When interpreting Article 2.4 of the TBT in EC -Sardines, the Appellate Body determined that a Codex Alimentarius standard was a 'relevant international standard', despite the fact thal il had not been adopted by consensus. The Appellate Body found thal in order for a standard to be used 'as a basis for' a technical regulation, il must be 'used as the principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation'. N evertheless, sin ce Members' measures are presumed to be WTO consistent, it is for the complainant to bear the burden of proving violation of Article 2.4 as a whole.
35
So, what does this mean for the climate change debate? If a WTO Member adopts a do mes tic regulation allegedly based on the K yoto Protocol or the UNFCCC, can this regulation be considered to 'be based on' an international standard within the meaning of Article 2.5 of the TBT, and th us presumed to be TBT/WTO consistent? The answer is not clear, as it depends on how one defines international standards. Many argue thal standards should be defined narrowly, which would exclude regulation adopted pursuant to an MEA such as tlle UNFCCC.
Should we argue, nevertheless, that sorne provisions contained in the Kyoto Protocol or the UNFCCC constitute international standards, then a WTO panel could indeed examine whether a national measure is a technical regulation within the TBT, and whether that regulation used a Kyoto standard as the 'principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation'. If, on the contrary, provisions of the K yoto Protocol or the UNFCCC were not considered to qualify as international standards, or if the national measure could not be viewed as a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT, the only option would be to invoke these provisions to demonstrate justification un der an exception provision, such as Article XX of the GATT.
This brings us back to the logic of the argumentation developed by the United States (and approved by the panel and the Appellate Body) in . In this dispute, the United States pointed to agreements reached with sorne WTO Members as examples of logical ways to deal with conservation of turtles. Malaysia opposed any reference to these regional arrangements because it was not a party to any of them. The Appellate Body said that concluding an agreement with the country opposing the restriction is not necessarily a pre-condition of a WTO consistent import restriction if one has tried in good faith but failed. If a WTO Member can, under the good faith prescriptions of Article XX, maintain an import restriction based on criteria determined unilaterally, there is no reas on wh y the same importing country would be in a worse position if such criteria came from an agreement to which only some of the WTO Members were signatories and the challenging Member was not.
Clearly, and 'as far as possible', a multilateral approach is strongly preferred. Y et it is one thing to prefera multilateral approach in the application of a measure that is provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994; it is another to require the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding 'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination' under the chapeau of Article XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement 36 (emphasis added).
In US -Shrimp, the Appellate Body had already stated that 'conditioning access to a Member' s dornes tic market on wh ether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member may, to sorne degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX'. Consequently, unilateral actions can find justification under Article XX of the GA TT and the existence of a multilateral agreement between the parties involved in a dispute is not a pre-condition to benefiting from WTO exception provisions. This jurisprudence is potentially relevant for disputes arising in relation to !rade measures laken pursuant to the UNFCCC or the K yoto Protocol. lt means th at, whenever relevant, participation in these treaties would be considered as one of the pertinent factual elements to demonstrate thal a !rade measure otherwise contrary to WTO obligations wonld nevertheless find justification under an exception provision.
IV. WTO and MEAs: the stakes in the negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda
The relationship between the GATT /WTO system and MEAs has been one of the main issues under discussion since 1992, when the tapie of !rade and environment emerged on the trade agenda. In December 2001, ministers decided to include this tapie in the Do ha Development Agenda (DDA). As noted by WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, '[a]s imperfee! as the WTO may be, it continues to offer the only forum worldwide thal is exclusively dedicated to discussing the relationship between trade and the environment'.
38
The mandate agreed at Doha requires Members to negotiate on:
[t]he relationship between existing WTO rules and specifie trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shaH be limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question. UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol do not mandate the nse of trade measures, wh ether between signatories or against non -signatories, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which is also pertinent in the context of elima te change policies, do es rely on trade measures.
lt is not the purpose of this contribution to undertake a detailed review of the arguments and positions developed by members of the CTESS, nor to discuss the various aspects of the relationships between trade and environment rules 41 We shall only recall that Members have always held different views on how to taclde this issue and that the negotiations seem to have had difficulties in narrowing the gap. The last report by the chairman of the CTESS indicates th at the group has before it two main proposais, which present 'two rather different perspectives with regard to the scope of the mandate in Paragraph 3l(i)'
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The proposai by the European Communities (EC) suggests a ministerial decision containing various princip les (mutual supportiveness, no subordination, deference and transparency) which would 'govern the relationship between MEAs and WTO rules'. The EC also proposes a right for MEA bodies to be granted observer status in relevant WTO bodies and an obligation for WTO committees and panels to 'cali for and defer to' MEA expertise whenever examining issues with environmental content relating to a particular MEA. 43 If accepted, this proposai would raise the profile of international environn1ental organisations in the WTO. However, it raises various interesting questions, sorne of which are being discussed in the CTESS. In practice, who will speak on behalf of the 'MEAs'? Assuming this role goes to the secretariats, will they have sufficient independence to give the expertise sought? Would WTO bodies be bound by the opinion given by an MEA? Wh at would be the relationship with The second proposa!, tabled by Australia and Argentina, is far Jess ambitions. It suggests that 'a short but substantive report be prepared, highlighting key observations from CTESS discussions and setting out areas of agreement and recommendations'. Exmnples of possible recommendations are limited to procedural proposais, such as Members 'continuing to share their national experiences relating to negotiating and implementing specifie trade obligations set out in MEAs' or reporting 'on their national coordination process'. 44 Whatever the outcome of this negotiation, one should note thal this discussion has been somehow 'overtaken by events' with the developments in WTO case law. Although no dispute involving trade measures taken pursuant to an MEA bas laken place so far, severa! principles found in the Appellate Body jurisprudence, in particular with respect to Article XX of the GATT, would be directly relevant should such a dispute arise (see above). 45 This issue, which raises the more general question of balance in the WTO between the law-making process (i.e. the negotiations, where political considerations can fully enter into play) and the judicial activities (i.e. dispute settlement, where political interference is limited), would be worth a separate discussion.
The second negotiating item contained in paragraph 31 of the Do ha Declaration is also directly relevant to the relationships between the WTO and multilateral environmental agreements. It requires Members to negotiate on 'procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for gran ting observer status'. Over the past ten years or so, collaboration between the WTO and MEA secretariats has developed on an ad hoc basis and has laken severa! forms. This collaboration is essentially of a technical nature and aims at increasing mutual understanding of the functioning and impact of relevant agreements (see above).
The mandate in paragraph 3l(ii) of the Doba Declaration aims at formalising the varions forms of collaboration, and appears to be Jess controversial than negotiations under paragraph 31 (i). Discussions focus on how to improve information exchange in the CTE, document exchange, future collaboration in the context of technical assistance and capacitybuilding activities, and criteria for observer status. According to the last chairman's report, these discussions have progressed significantly and 'convergence [has] started to emerge on basic elements for an outcome' 46 This negotiation may be beneficiai if it allows the clarification and even expansion of the activities between the secretariats of the MEAs and the WTO. However, it may also entail the risk of creating a straitjacket which proves unable to a da pt quicldy to new circumstances.
V. Conclusion
Is the WTO equipped to ensure smooth policy co-ordination with climate change instruments and institutions? In our view, the WTO provides an appropriate framework for Members to discuss !rade and elima te change issues, as part of the more general debate on !rade and the environment. In addition, the WTO dispute settlement system has shown thal il is able to integrale non-trade values and to make space for non-trade law. Since US-Shrimp, we koowthat WTO Members can implement unilateral measures to deal with environmental concerns. There are, however, severa! important challenges ahead. The international community may face a proliferation of unilateral or regional standards thal may not be the most environmentally effective, even if they can be considered WTO consistent ( which is likely to be the case for most of them). In this context, issues of mutual recognition will become difficult and may lead to increased tensions with th ose Members th at are excluded from recognition schemes. Further thought will also have to be given to the interaction ofWTO agreements with climate change instruments currently under consideration in sorne countries, such as carbon tax, cap-and-trade systems, and green certificates. Moreover, the scientific and technical difficulties linked to assessing the real impact of GHG reduction measures on climate change mitigation will complicate assessment of their WTO consistency. Final! y, the use of priva te standards is likely to increase, bence the need to improve the understanding of their interaction with the WTO and to ensure their co-ordination with governmental standards. Another important challenge is the need to involve developing countries, bath in the WTO and in the UNFCCC, with dne respect for their development needs and priorities. Can the WTO be used to crea te incentives for developing countries? According to case law (India-GSP), market access preferences can be conditioned on development related criteria. The main question here is whether elima te change related preferences could be considered (directly) linked to (sustainable) developrnent. Finally, the relationship between !rade and dimate change cannat be separated from the !rade and energy dehale, which involves competition and investment issues, and WTO rules are still very much incornplete in these fields. Ultirnately, the main concern of the international community is thal environrnentally effective measures be adopted. And wh ether or not such measures are fully WTO consistent is not a prerequisite for efficiency.
The 1nain problen1 is not institutional because the international insti-
lutions will do what their masters tell them to do. The most important question is whether or not there is political cornmitrnent by the entire international comrnunity to take allnecessary measures to fight climate change. The ultirnate arbitrators between conflicting values (assuming that \rade and environrnent are conflicting, an assumption that we do not share) are not panels, the Appellate Body or even the WTO, but governrnents themselves. States are the ultimate arbitrators between opposing or contradictory rights, obligations and values. International institutions, including the WTO, can only play a supportive role in offering fora in which states can devise and irnplement solutions, as well as strengthen their co-operation and co-ordination. 
